McGeorge Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 1

Article 6

1-1-1982

The Duty of Hospitals and Hospital Medical Staffs
to Regulate the Quality of Patient Care: A Legal
Perspective
B. Abbott Goldberg
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
B. A. Goldberg, The Duty of Hospitals and Hospital Medical Staffs to Regulate the Quality of Patient Care: A Legal Perspective, 14 Pac. L. J.
55 (1982).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol14/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

The Duty of Hospitals and Hospital
Medical Staffs to Regulate the Quality
of Patient Care: A Legal Perspective

B. ABBOTT GOLDBERG*

Greaterthan the tread of mighty armies
is an idea whose hour has come.

Victor Hugo (attributed)
The idea whose hour has come is "Hospitals should, in short, shoul-

der the responsibilities borne by everyone else."' It is supported by two
subsidiary ideas-that hospitals, even charitable hospitals, are businesses and that hospitals treat patients. "This all seems so clear on
principle that one wonders why there should ever have been any doubt

about it."' The purpose of this article is to explain why there was
doubt and why the application of ordinary legal principles to hospitals
has produced so much concern and a small library of legal comment.

The explanation will focus on one topic-the potential liability of a
hospital to a patient for the negligent appointment to or retention on its
medical staff of the patient's private physician, that is, liability for cor* B.A.; LL.B.; Judge of the Superior Court, Retired; Scholar in Residence, University of
the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, California. The author thanks Miss Margaret
E. Dailey of Portland, Oregon, J.D., 1982, McGeorge School of Law, his research assistant during
1980-82. A shorter version is scheduled as a chapter in QUALITY ASSURANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND PROGRAM EVALUATION: TOOLS FOR CLINICIANS AND ADMINISTRATORS (J. Pena, A.
Haffner, B. Rosen and D. Light eds.) to be published by Aspen Systems Corporation, Rockville,
Maryland.
I. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 666, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 (1957).
2. Cassidy v. Ministry of Health, [1951] 2 K.B. 343, 360 (Denning, L.J.).
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porate negligence, which is now the common expression.' Eliminated
from consideration is a hospital's liability for the negligence of its actual employees, ostensible or apparent employees, tenants such as radiologists or pathologists and emergency room contractors-persons for
whose negligence the hospital may be held liable even though it was
not negligent itself. Omitted are cases explainable under the doctrine
of respondeat superior ("let the master be responsible") except insofar
as these cases are explanatory of the development of the concept of the
hospital's corporate negligence.
The leading case, although not the most illuminating one, Darling v.
Charleston Community MemorialHospital,' is an illustration of hospital

inattention to the enforcement of obligations imposed by law and assumed by accreditation and its own bylaws. A young athlete broke a
leg playing football. He was admitted as an emergency patient and put
in a cast by the private staff physician on emergency call pursuant to
the hospital's medical staff bylaws.' The doctor applied no padding
and put the cast on too tightly. As a result of the constriction, the leg
became necrotic; there were obvious symptoms such as foul odor,6 discoloration and loss of sensation. Despite the medical staff bylaw requiring consultation in "all major cases," none was had.7 After 15 days
of intense suffering the lad was transferred to another hospital where,
eventually, his leg was amputated.
Although the doctor settled in the ensuing litigation, the hospital
went to trial on the theories that its liability as a charity was limited
and that it could be held to no higher standard of care than that "customarily offered by hospitals generally in its community." 8 The hospital lost, but the grounds on which it lost are not particularly clear. Put
narrowly, the grounds were that the nurses failed to call the patient's
3. The first use of "corporate negligence" found in this connection is Note, Torts-Hosptal'r
Liability-StandardofCare, 43 N.C.L. REv. 469, 471 (1965). The term seems to be derived from

the effort to limit charitable immunity by distinguishing between "corporate negligence

. . .

in

employing incompetent servants" and the "doctrine of 'respondeat superior'" imposing liability
"for the negligence of. . . subordinate agents selected with care." Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham
Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 67, 126 N.E. 392, 393 (1920); Note, CharitableHospitals'LiabilityforNegligence: AbrogatioRoftheMedical-AdminisirativeDistinction, 7 DUKE L.J. 127, 130 n.15 (1958). See
note 30 infra.
4. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), ajfg 50 111.App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964).
5. 50 IlI. App. 2d at 268, 284, 200 N.E.2d at 158, 165. California requires the medical staff
to have such a rule. 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §70703, (g) (1975). See also, JOINT COMMISSION ON
ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 24 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as AMH].
6. "An odor of decaying flesh" which one witness had not smelled since World War II. 50
Ill. App. 2d at 287, 200 N.E.2d at 167.
7. Id. at 283, 200 N.E.2d at 165. California requires the medical staffto develop criteria for
consultation. 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §70703, (j) (1975). See also AMH, supra note 5, at 104-05
(requirement in medical staff bylaws).
8. 33 IlI. 2d at 331, 211 N.E.2d at 257; 50 Ill. App. 2d at 309, 200 N.E.2d at 177.
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deteriorating condition to the attention of the hospital administration
and that the hospital failed to review the doctor's work or require consultation as required by its own rules. More broadly, grounds were that
the hospital's duty of care was not defined by the customs of its
community.
The Standards for Hospital Accreditation, the state licensing regulations and the defendant's bylaws demonstrate that the medical profession and other responsible authorities regard it as both desirable
and feasible that a hospital assume certain responsibilities for the
care of the patient.' 0
Tested by conventional legal rules, the resulting hospital liability was
unremarkable. By 1965 charitable immunity, the proposition that a
charity was not liable for the negligence of its agents, servants or employees, had been in the process of judicial abandonment for more than
two decades."
Institutions should shoulder the responsibilities all other citizens
bear. They should minister as others do, within the obligation not to
injure through carelessness ...
The incorporated charity should respond as do private individuals,
corporations and others, when it does good in the wrong
business
12
way.
Adherence to community standards or even general standards for hospital conduct was obviously inappropriate for it would have allowed
hospitals to write their own tickets. '" Bing v. Thunig,' 4 relied on in Darling, had already abolished the special immunity enjoyed by hospitals
in New York but by no other employers and held a hospital liable for
the negligence of its employed nurses. It was already commonplace
law that violation of a statute or regulation intended for the benefit of
the public was either negligence or evidence of negligence.' 5 The rep9. 33 Ill. 2d at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258; 50 Ill. App. 2d at 306, 200 N.E.2d at 166 (the hospital
administrator "knew the patient was a problem").
10. 33 Ill. 2d at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
11. A catalogue by jurisdiction of the various modes and qualifications of the abolition of

both charitable immunity and governmental immunity appears in 2 D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 17.01-17.57 and id. 1981 Supp. 3-34.
12. President and Dir. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 814-15, 828 (D.C.
Cir. 1942) (special nurse injured by student nurse allowed recovery against hospital; the leading
case on judicial abandonment of charitable immunity).
13. Note the two aspects. The "locality rule" might not apply because many communities
have but one hospital, there is no other to compare it to, and, in effect, it would set its own
standards. Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 194, 349 A.2d 245, 253
(1975). And a hospital may not escape liability merely by doing what all other hospitals are
doing. A calling may not set its own tests to the exclusion of the courts, because the whole calling
may be negligent. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932), citedin Darling, 33 Ill. 2d at
332, 211 N.E.2d at 257, and S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT 244 (1978) (discussing Gonzales v. Nork).
14. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §286 and Comment f, §288B (1965).
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resentation of particular competence or the voluntary assumption of a
duty of care, as by seeking and obtaining accreditation, had long been a
basis of liability. 6 In addition, the liability of a hospital for allowing
the violation of its own rules', although a little more obscure, had been7
established generations before and is not a peculiarity of hospital law.'
Although somewhat obscure, in Darling,'" the point that a hospital
may be liable for failing to review the work of a staff physician retained
by a patient is, nevertheless, analytically simple. Although it had become conventional to refer to a staff physician as an independent contractor,' 9 the physician was not, and ordinarily still is not, an
independent contractor employed by the hospital. The private staff
physician who admits and cares for a private patient is not employed
by the hospital in any sense, neither as an independent contractor,
agent, servant nor otherwise. The physician is actually a concessionaire
or licensee of the hospital-a person allowed to do his own business in
the hospital to help the hospital accomplish its function of treating the
patient, very much as the proprietor of an amusement park may allow
the operation of various attractions by third persons. If there is any
consideration paid, it is not by the owner of the facility as an employer,
but rather by the concessionaire for the privilege of using the facility.
Thus, a staff physician may be required to pay dues, 20 to participate in
staff activities, 2' and, as in Darling,to be available for emergencies, all
as consideration for the privilege of remaining on the staff. Of course,
the hospital, like any other possessor of land, is under a duty to use
reasonable care to prevent harm by its concessionaires or licensees, in
this case the staff physicians. 22 The hospital is not analogous to a landlord or lessor of chattels. The landlord or lessor of chattels is ordinarily
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§299A, 323, 324A (1965); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS §56 at 344-47, 350 n.52 (4th ed. 1971). See Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411, 430 (1879) (concurring opinion). See generally James v. United States, 483 F.
Supp. 581, 584-85 (N.D. Cal. 1980) and Coffee v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 551, 55758, 503 P.2d 1366, 1370, 105 Cal. Rptr. 358, 362 (1972).
17. Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp., 12 R.I. 411,422, 425 (1879) (intern's violation of hospital
rule that he summon surgeon in difficult cases); Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council, [1947] 1
K.B. 598, 608-09, 614 (nurse's and pharmacist's violation of hospital rule requiring medical of.
ficer's signature on order for drugs). See generally Dillenbeck v. City of Los Angeles, 69 Cal. 2d
472, 481, 446 P.2d 129, 135, 72 Cal. Rptr. 321, 327 (1968) and W. PROSSER, TORTS §33, at 168 (4th
ed. 1971). Cf. 33 Ill. 2d at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
18. The Darlingcase is accepted authority for this proposition even though it was not stated
clearly in the opinion. 33 II. 2d at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258. The evidence supported the verdict on
the alternative grounds of negligence of the nurses or violation of the hospital's rule on
consultation.
19. E.g., Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914).
20. Cf. Volpicelli v. Jared Sydney Torrance Memorial Hosp., 109 Cal. App. 3d 242, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 610 (1980).
21. AMH, supra note 5, at 104; 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §70703, (d) (1975).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§318, 344, 415 comment c (1965).
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not responsible for the torts of his tenant or lessee, because the landlord
or lessor is only in the business of renting, not in the business of
treating.
Although it seems clear as a matter of elementary law that a hospital
could be liable for its own negligence in the selection or retention of
incompetent physicians on its medical staff, Darling was an enormous
surprise to the medical and hospital community. It has been characterized as undoubtedly "the most significant medical malpractice case of
the 1960's,"' 3 and it created a furor with overtones continuing to this
day. 4 A current text calls it "a hard case,"2 5 bringing to mind the old
aphorism, "Hard cases make bad law." The rejoinder to this is "Bad
law makes hard cases."2" The law before Darlingwas bad if judged by
its lack of conformity to the law generally, its disregard of the role of
modem hospitals, and its frustration of common expectations. Darling
was a departure, "a revolutionary decree,"' 7 but only from the judicially devised rules immunizing hospitals from liability, which rules
had already been castigated as
the failure of the courts to require observance by the hospital of what
would seem to be an obvious duty-to see that incompetent practitioners are not permitted the use of hospital facilities even under the
heading of independent contractors.28
The story of how and why hospitals were exempted from obvious
duties and did not have to shoulder the responsibilities borne by everyone else began on December 9, 1870, when James McDonald, a construction worker, sustained a fractured femur. He was treated at the
Massachusetts General Hospital, a charity, by a student intern supervised by a "visiting surgeon," what we would now call a staff physician.
The result was unsatisfactory, and McDonald sued the hospital. He
lost because the court, relying on English precedents that had been
overruled, announced, for the first time in this country, the doctrine of
charitable immunity.2 9 Under this doctrine a charitable hospital would
23. W. CURRAN & E. SHAPIRO, LAW, MEDICINE AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 368 (3d ed. 1982).
24. Copeland, Hospital Responsibilityfor Basic Care Provided by Medical Staff Members:
'4m I My Brother's Keeper?", 5 N. KY. L. REv. 27, 33 n.30 (1978); Dunn, Hospital Corporate
Liability: The Trend Continues, 8 MEDICOLOGICAL NEWS, Oct. 1980, at 16. Copeland is both a
hospital administrator and a lawyer and wrote from both points of view. His article is particularly
comprehensive and interesting.
25. A. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 411 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as SOTrrHWICK].
26. Hayes, Crogate's Case: 4 Dialogue in ye Shades on Special Pleading Reform in 9 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 423 (3d ed. 1944).
27. Note, Hospital'sLiabilityforPoorMedical Treatment,39 Hospitals, J.A. HosP. A., Dec. 1,

1965, at 118. "A major disappointment ...

a potent blow."

28. Note, Liability of HospitalforInjuries to PatientsUsing HospitalFacilities,48 YALE L.J.

81, 85 (1938).
29. McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876). The like result in a simi-
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not be liable for the acts of its "inferior agents" if they had been selected with due care. "[T]he funds entrusted to it are not to be diminished by such casualties" as befell the unfortunate McDonald.3 0
Charitable immunity became a general rule in this country for many
years and, since it applied in most of the cases, relieved the courts of
the burden of considering the relationship between the hospital and its
physicians, either staff or employed, its nurses and other professional or
lay personnel.
For legal precedent on the relationship between a hospital and its
staff physicians, one must look at cases when charitable immunity did
not apply-actually cases in which the rules of responsibility for the
acts of others were tortured to achieve the same result as the immunity.
Glavin v. Rhode IslandHospital3 ' is the archetype. Glavin, a worker in
a lumber yard, lost two fingers to a circular saw. He was treated at the
hospital, a charity, by an intern, who, in violation of the hospital's
rules, neglected to summon a surgeon promptly and applied a tourniquet. The delay and the procedure resulted in the amputation of Glavin's arm, and he sued the hospital. Its defense of charitable immunity
was rejected. The argument from English authority contradicted rather
than supported the result in McDonald,3 2 and the argument on policy
was "not a question for the court but for the legislature."3 3
Since it rejected the charitable immunity, the court had to consider
whether the intern was a servant for whose violation of the rule the
hospital was vicariously liable under respondeat superior. Adopting a
contention in McDonald,34 the Rhode Island Hospital argued: it "undertook merely to provide the plaintiff the shelter, food, warmth and
nursing of a hospital;" it "did not undertake the duties of a surgeon in
treating the plaintiffs injury, but only to place him in charge of the
intern or visiting surgeon;" and, "not undertaking professional charge
of the plaintiff, [it] owed him no professional duty, and would not be
responsible for a breach of professional duty on the part of the inlar case was popularly lauded because malpractice suits against charities showed that some patients were "wholly devoid of ordinary gratitude." M. VOGEL, THE INVENTION OF THE MODERN
HOSPITAL, BOSTON, 1870-1930 at 28 (1980).
30. 120 Mass. at 436. The exception to charitable immunity was frequently stated but seldom
held. It was denied in Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., 235 Mass. 66, 70, 126 N.E. 392, 396
(1920); Note, supra note 3, at 129-30 n.15. It was applied in Norfolk ProtestantHosp. v. Plunkett,
162 Va. 151, 173 S.E. 363 (1934) (bladder injured by vaginal douche administered by incompetent
nurse). Like the "captain of the ship" doctrine, see note 88 infra, it served "the obvious practical
purpose of cutting down an immunity that promises more harm than good." Comment, 37 HARV.
L. REV. 263, 264 (1923).
31. 12 R.I. 411 (1879).
32. Id. at 422-23, 426-29.
33. Id. at 425-26.
34. 120 Mass. at 434.
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tern. '35 The court found it easy to imagine a case where a hospital
might agree to do "no more than furnish hospital accommodations,
leaving the patient to find his own physician." The hospital would then
not be liable because the physician was not its servant. But here the
hospital had undertaken to select a physician. Nevertheless, the hospital was not liable because mere selection did not make the physician its
servant.3 6 The court put what can be called the helpful neighbor
analogy:
If A out of charity employs a physician to attend B, his sick neighbor,
the physician does not become A's servant, and A, if he has been
duly careful in selecting him, will not be answerable to B for his malpractice. The reason is that A does not undertake to treat B through
the agency of the physician, but only to procure for B the services of
the physician. The relation of master and servant is not established
between A and the physician. And so there is no such relation between the corporation and the physicians and surgeons who give
their services at the hospital. It is true the corporation has power to
dismiss them, but it has this power not because they are its servants,
but because of its control of the hospital where their services are rendered. They would not recognize the right of the corporation while
retaining them, to direct them in their treatment of patients.37
The case of the intern, however, was different. He acted not only as a
physician but also, under the hospital's rules, as the person appointed
to "send for the surgeon of the day."
Here then we have the relation of principal and agent, or master and
servant. If the intern neglects to call the surgeon in the class of cases
designated, his neglect is the neglect of the corporation. 38
39
And so the hospital lost and "the case was subsequently settled."
Glavin was remarkably modern in its rejection of charitable immunity and in the concurring opinion which would have held that the hospital treated the patient and furnished a physician to him for whose
competence it was responsible.4 0 But these ideas were in advance of
their time and disappeared for seven or eight decades. What endured
from Glavin was the notion that hospitals were liable only for some of
the acts of their employees in the course of their employment. They
were liable for their "administrative" or "ministerial" acts but not for
their "professional" or "medical acts" because they could not control
35. 12 R.I. at 417. Glavin was charged only for "board, washing, warmth, and the services of
nurses and ward tenders," $21.47, at the rate of $8 per week. Id. at 421.
36. Id. at 423-24.
37. Id. at 424. See also id. at 430-31 (concurring on negligent selection).
38. Id. at 425.
39. Id. at 435.
40. Id. at 433.
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acts of the latter descriptions. If they could not control, and hence were

not liable for, the "professional" or "medical" acts of employees, it followed even more certainly that they were not liable for the acts of non-

employees such as private staff physicians. But although ability to control may be made the basis of liability, absence of the ability to control
is not necessarily a basis for nonliability. 1

At the time of McDonald and Glavin hospitals were only emerging
from the period when they had been institutions primarily for sheltering the poor without a connotation of medical care. 42 It is no coincidence that both were cases of humble laborers; they were the sort of
people for whom hospitals were intended. The well-to-do were cared
for at home. Only a small minority of doctors practiced in hospitals,

and, as the years advanced, those who did not decried the idea that
surgery should be done only in hospitals rather than on kitchen tables
at home. Those who did practice in hospitals constituted a medical
elite which used hospital experience for education and prestige. 43 It
was not until the 1890's, when economic pressure forced hospitals to

rely on paying patients and, therefore, on private physicians who could
supply such patients, that "hospitals became more clearly defined as

places for medical treatment rather than shelters for the poor and
homeless."' Only after substantial numbers of doctors treated paying
patients in hospitals did the movement for improving the quality of
hospital care begin. Until then "[H]ospitals [were] in many instances
walk-in garbage cans, which people entered reluctantly as a last resort
before death."45

The impetus for the improvement of the quality of hospital care must
be attributed to a desire for medical excellence rather than to any legal
compulsion. The impetus of the law was to encourage the private
88.

41.

See the discussion of Cassidy v. Ministry of Health, [1951] 2 K.B. 343, 360 infra at note

42. The legal sense of the word hospital is a corporate foundation, endowed for the
perpetual distribution of the founder's charity, in the lodging and maintenance of a certain number of poor persons, according to the regulations and statutes of the founder.
Such institutions are not necessarily connected with medicine or surgery, and in their
original establishment had no necessary reference to sickness or accident. Grant Corporations (ed. 1850) 567.
9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 45 n.2 (3d ed. 1944).
43. Vogel, The Transformation of the American Hospital, 1850-1920 in HEALTH CARE IN
AMERICA 109, 109 (S. Reverby and D. Rosner eds. 1979). One judge recognized this in Glavin:
In the present case the services were gratuitous to the person injured, but the agent [physician] is indirectly compensated by the corporation: ie., by the opportunities for acquiring skill, experience, reputation, and subsequent practice in the profession.
12 R.I. at 431 (concurring opinion).
44. Rosner, Businessat the Bedside: Health Carein Brooklyn, 1890-1915 in HEALTH CARE IN
AMERICA 124 (S. Reverby and D. Rosner eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Rosner]. See generally
M. VOGEL, THE INVENTION OF THE MODERN HOSPITAL, BOSTON, 1870-1930 at 29 passin, 67
(1980).
45. Schlicke,American Surgery'sNoblest Experiment, 106 ARCHIVES OF SURGERY 379 (1973).

1982 / Quality of Patient Care

benefactions on which the hospitals were so dependent. Thus within
nine months after Glavin, the Rhode Island Legislature exempted charitable hospitals from liability for the negligent and even malicious acts
of their officers, agents or employees-a statute not changed for almost
a century.4 6 And Glavin's denial of charitable immunity was derided
by courts which refused to follow it.4 7
Glavin had another effect equally devastating to the concept of hospital liability for the quality of patient care by physicians. The King's
Bench in England used it as a precedent for Hilyer v. Governors of St.
Bartholomew's Hospital.4 8 Hillyer, in turn, became a precedent for a
case of utmost importance in American law, Schloendorff v. Society of
New York Hospital.49 Hillyer and Schloendorf are prime examples of
how the courts tinkered with the ordinary rules of responsibility to
reach the result of charitable immunity in cases when it did not apply.
Hillyer, a "medical man" at "the end of his resources," a charity patient, sustained paralyzing injuries to his arms during surgery on his
leg, an obvious case of negligent positioning. Present during the surgery were a "consulting surgeon," "house surgeons," "certificated
nurses," and "box-carriers." All except the consulting surgeon seem to
have been employees of the hospital. Nevertheless, the hospital was
not held liable. The court picked up Glavin's helpful neighbor analogy
and applied it to the nurses and house surgeons. The only duty the
hospital undertook was that the patient should be treated by "experts,
whether surgeons, physicians or nurses of whose professional competence the governors have taken reasonable care to assure themselves."5 0
There was no evidence of improper selection,5" and the hospital was
not liable "if members of its professional staff, of whose competence
there is no question, act negligently towards the patient in some matter
of professional care or skill. .. ."I' The court expanded on the distinction made in Glavin between the intern's role as a physician and his
46. 1880 R.I. Pub. Laws c. 802, at 107; R.I. GEN. LAws §7-1-22 (1956), repealedby 1968 R.I.
Pub. Laws c. 43, §2, as amended by R.I. GEN. LAWS §9-1-26 (Supp. 1981) (charitable hospitals
liable as "at common law"). Hodge v. Osteopathic Gen. Hosp., 107 R.I. 135, 136 n.2, 145, 265
A.2d 733, 735 n.22, 739 (1970) (repeal not retroactive). Fournier v. Miriam Hospital, 93 R.I. 299,
308, 175 A.2d 298, 302 (1961), ajf'don rehearing,93 R.I. 308, 179 A.2d 578 (1962) (statute of 1880
constitutional because remedy against negligent actors preserved).
47. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 499, 208 A.2d 193, 199-200 (1965) (rejecting
charitable immunity, the rule for 77 years, and holding hospital liable to patient for negligence of
employees). Apparently unaware of the 1880 Rhode Island statute, the Pennsylvania court lauded
Rhode Island as "a state. . . with wisdom and courage in inverse proportion to its geographical
size." Id. at 499, 208 A.2d at 199.
48. [1909] 2 K.B. 820.
49. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
50. 2 K.B. at 829.
51. Id. at 826, 830.
52. .d. at 829.
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role as a messenger. The hospital could not be made liable for matters
of "professional skill, in which the governors of the hospital neither can
nor could properly interfere either by rule or supervision," although
they might be liable for their servants' performance of "purely ministerial or administrative duties," such as attending on the wards, summoning aid (e.g., Glavin), or supplying food. 3 The question of the liability
'5 4
for the non-professional box-carriers was "conveniently forgotten.
In short:
The legal duty which the hospital authority undertakes towards a
patient... is not the ordinaryduty of a person who deals with another through his servants or agents and undertakes responsibility to
that other person for damage resulting from any injury
inflicted upon
55
him by the negligence of those servants or agents.
Hilyer did not consider charitable immunity because, despite McDonald, it was not applied in England. But many years later the extraordinary exemption from ordinary duties was recognized as "a desire to
relieve the charitable hospitals from liabilities which they could not
afford."5 6
The fear of prejudicing hospital finances was, however, an express
rationale of Schloendorf:
A ruling would, indeed be an unfortunate one that might constrain
charitable institutions, as a measure of self-protection, to limit their
activities. A hospital opens its doors without discrimination to all
who seek its aid. . . . In this beneficient work, it does not subject
itself to liability for damages, though the ministers of
healing whom
57
it has selected have proved unfaithful to their trust.
Although New York recognized charitable immunity, the court had to
abridge the ordinary duties to protect the hospital in Schloendoff because the immunity did not apply in that case. Mrs. Schloendorff
claimed that she had been operated on by a "visiting physician" and a
"house physician" under circumstances which should have suggested to
the hospital's nurses that she had not consented. Since the trial court
53. Id. at 829.
54. Goodhart, Hospitalsand TrainedNurses, 54 LAW Q. REV. 553, 556 (1938). But see 2 K.B.
at 828.
55. 2 K.B. at 828-29 (emphasis added).
56. Cassidy v. Ministry of Health, [1951] 2 K.B. 343, 361. Goodhart, supra note 54, at 561,
574.
57. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. at 135, 105 N.E. at 95. By relieving a
hospital of a "grave responsibility and a budgetary item [it] would have had to assume," Judge
Cardozo played a "favourite among competing social forces." B. LEVY, CARDOZO AND FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THINKING 103, 104 (1938). As late as 1939 Schloendorf was listed among the
"tort cases which illustrate his permeating influence and his wisdom in decision," particularly as
delineating "the extent of immunity of eleemosynary institutions and the reasons for granting it."
Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo andtheLaw of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372, 405, 406 (1939), reprinted
in 390 YALE L.J. 390, 423, 424, and 39 COLUM. L. REv. 20, 53, 54 (1939). But "In lapidary

inscriptions a man is not upon oath." 2 J. BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 407 (Apr. 7, 1775).

1982 / Quality of Patient Care

had directed a verdict for the hospital, "her narrative, even if improbable, must be taken as true. ' 8 Thus Mrs. Schloendorff was the victim of
a battery, an intentional tort. Charitable immunity did not apply to
intentional torts, and without it the court, as in Glavin and Hilyer, had
to consider the relationship between the hospital and its staff physicians
and employees. Judge Cardozo, then on the Court of Appeals for but
three months, relied on Glavin as extended by Hillyer and articulated it
further:
[T]he true ground for the defendant's exemption from liability is that
the relation between a hospital and its physicians is not that of
master and servant. The hospital does not undertake to act through
them,
but merely to procure them to act on their own responsibility.59 The wrong was not that of the hospital; it was that of physicians, who were not the defendant's servants, but were pursuing an
independent calling, a profession sanctioned by solemn oath, and
safeguarded by stringent penalties. If, in serving their patient, they
violated her commands, the responsibility is not the defendant's; it is
theirs. There is no distinction in that respect between the visiting and
the resident physicians. Whether the hospital undertakes to procure
a physician from60 afar, or to have [one] on the spot, its liability remains the same.
It is true I think, of nurses, as of physicians, that in treating a patient, they are not acting as servants of the hospital. . . .The hospital undertakes to procure for the patient the services of a nurse. It
does not undertake, through the agency of nurses, to render those
services itself. The reported cases make no distinction in that respect
between the position of a nurse and that of a physician. . . and none
is justified in principle. 6 '
Judge Cardozo recognized the possible liability for negligent selection
of the physician as an independent contractor and for negligence of
nurses in relation "to the administrative conduct of the hospital," but
he did not develop these because they were not shown by the record.62
In Schloendorff the hospital had selected the physician but, nevertheless, escaped liability. Had the patient chosen her own doctor the case
would have been even stronger, for according to Glavin:
It is quite conceivable that a corporation might not agree to do more
than furnish hospital accommodations, leaving the patient to find his
own physician or surgeon. In such a case the corporation would
58. 211 N.Y. at 128, 105 N.E. at 93. Nevertheless, Cardozo seems to have disbelieved the
plaintiff. "[I]f we are to credit the plaintiff's narrative." Id. at 131, 105 N.E. at 94.
59. Id. at 130, 105 N.E. at 94.
60. Id. at 131-32, 105 N.E. at 94 (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 132, 105 N.E. at 94.
62. Id. at 129, 105 N.E. at 93 (care in selection); Id. at 132, 105 N.E. at 94 (administrative
conduct "not established by this record").
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plainly not be liable for the torts of the physicians or surgeons, for in
it would not have
such a case they would not be its servants and
63
selection.
their
in
responsibility
any
assumed
When coupled with cases such as Hiloyer and Schloendorff what had
been only "conceivable" in Glavin turned into common understanding
among both lawyers and doctors. Lawyers described a hospital as "re-

ally not much more than a specialized hotel" or workshop where a doctor chosen by the patient could do as he saw fit without subjecting the
hotelier or proprietor of the workshop to any liability for the quality of

the physicians' care.64 The attitude of doctors was the same. A sur-

veyor for the American College of Surgeons in 1917 reported they considered a hospital
a more convenient place.

.

than the home in which to perform an

operation and for the patient to remain during his convalescence.

The hospital's sole obligation was to furnish space with proper heat,
light and food for the patient. When these services were paid for by
the patient and he was discharged, the hospital's interest and obligation to the patient ceased.6

This is almost a paraphrase of the hospital's argument in Glavin.66

But change was in the wind. Dr. Ernest Amory Codman of Boston, a
man of astonishing prescience, had already recognized that "charitable

hospitals have become businesses . . ., 67 -an idea that was not to begin to be generally accepted by the courts for some thirty-five years.68
Dr. Codman was to serve as a precursor of legal thinking in another
way. He was the "grand-daddy of efforts in quality of care evaluation
in this country. ' 69 In 1913 he told the Philadelphia County Medical
63. Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp., 12 R.I. at 423.
64. Alden v. Providence Hospital, 382 F.2d 163, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Berger, J., dissenting,
"a hostel with special services" but no diagnostic function). The analogy has also been stated only
to disagree with it: Fridena v. Evans, 127 Ariz. 516, -, 622 P.2d 463, 465 (1980) ("a physical
structure and furnishings in which physicians practiced their art"); Smith v. Duke Univ. Hosp.,
219 N.C. 628, 634, 14 S.E.2d 643, 647 (1941) (hospital only a provider of room and board);
Yepremian v. Scarborough General Hospital, 88 D.L.R.3d 161, 172 (Ont. 1978) (a "specialized
kind of hotel" if physician is private but not if employed); Koskoff and Nadeau, HospitalLabl .
The Emerging Standardof Care, 48 CONN. B.J. 305, 309 (1974) (more than a hotel or workshop);
S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT 54 (1978) (hotel for the sick, workshop for physician);
SoUtrHWICK,supra note 25, at 346 ("a mere facility or hotel. . . a 'doctor's workshop' "). But see
even the defense testimony in Darling:
[A] hospital is more than just bricks and mortar. . . . [T]he governing board is responsible for the proper care of the patient. . . it has the power to choose the standard of
medicine that will be practiced in its hospital ....
50 Ill. App. 2d at 300, 200 N.E.2d at 173.
65. L. DAVIS, FELLOWSHIP OF SURGEONS 205 (1960) [hereinafter cited as L. DAvis].
66. 12 R.I. at 417.
67. Rosner, supra note 44, at 124. "[Tjoday's hospital . . . operates . . . in a businesslike
fashion." Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 664, 143 N.E.2d 3, 7, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 9 (1957).
68. See notes 11, 12supra.
69. S.JONAS, MEDICAL MYSTERY 147 (1978). The idea of review did not originate with
Codman. It had been suggested as early as 1732. Id. Dr. John Gregory, professor of medicine at
Edinburgh and author of a work on medical ethics, suggested independent reviewers in 1770. J.
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Society that the main product of a hospital was the patient who had

been treated there and that the skill of a hospital's staff could be judged
only by the "common sense notion that every hospital should follow
every patient it treats, long enough to determine whether or not the
treatment has been successful and then to inquire, if not, why not?"7
What is important to note here is that at the time Judge Cardozo was

announcing as a matter of law that hospitals merely procured physicians for the patient to act on their own responsibility,7" the workshop

idea, Dr. Codman was recognizing that a hospital treated a patient-an
idea that was resisted by courts as late as 1967.72

Dr. Codman's efforts were initially unsuccessful. He was branded an
eccentric and had to leave the Massachusetts General Hospital and es-

tablish his own hospital to develop a systematic means of evaluating
what he called "end-results. '73 A survey for the American College of
Surgeons in 1918 showed that only 89 of 692 hospitals investigated

could meet even the simplest requirements, a statistic so embarassing
that the report was suppressed and the printed copies were destroyed.7 4

Nevertheless, in 1919 the American College of Surgeons, in an effort
to create an organization "devoted completely to the evaluation of pro-

fessional and hospital standards which would benefit the patient,"
adopted its "minimum standard" that each hospital have an organized

staff of competent physicians who would adopt rules governing their
BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY 88, 92 (1975). But Percival's Medical Ethics became
dominant in this country, and they called only for moral sanctions and left "accountability for
mistakes to individual conscience rather than collective professional action." Id. at 78. A varia-

tion of this idea of moral rather than coercive enforcement was to reappear. It is said to have been
argued in Darling that "if licensing and accrediting bodies are satisfied that their regulations are
being met," the courts should not interfere. Foster, Illinois Case Extends Hospital Liability, 103
MOD. Hosp., Sept. 1964, at 95. In Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 309, 350
A.2d 534, 538 (1975), the New Jersey Hospital Association argued that competence should be
determined exclusively by the "hospital and its related personnel," not by the courts. And in
Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital, 99 Wis. 2d 708, 733, 301 N.W.2d 156, 169 (1981),
the hospital argued unsuccessfully that a statutory declaration of its "moral obligation" negated its
common law duty of care. Such faith in conscience and contrition might call for recitation of the
General Confession in the Book of Common Prayer: "We have left undone those things we ought
to have done; And we have done those things which we ought not to have done; And there is no
health in us."
70. E. CODMAN, THE SHOULDER xii (1934). Dr. Codman wistfully recalled the "End Result
Idea" as "the great and still unsuccessful interest of my life, over which I have toiled harder and
suppressed more regrets, than over any other star-gazing period of my career." Id. See also L.
Davis, supra note 65, at 116; Goldberg, The Duty ofHospitals andHospitalMedicalStaffs to Regulate the Quality a/PatientCare, 129 W.J. MED. 443, 445-46 (1978).
71. Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 131-32, 105 N.E. 92, 94 (1914).
72. Alden v. Providence Hosp., 328 F.2d 163, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (hospital liable for negligence of employed physician, chief medical resident; dissent that hospital did not treat patient).
Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 519, 521, 208 A.2d 193, 209, 210 (1965) (charitable
immunity abolished; dissent, "[Hospitals and public charities] are, next to the Church, the greatest
benefactors known to mankind. . . and. . . always have been favorites of the law...").
73. C. JACOBs, T. CHRISTOFFEL, & N. DIXON, MEASURING THE QUALITY OF PATIENT CARE
24 (1976).
74. L. DAvis, supra note 65, at 221. Goldberg, supra note 70, at 445.
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professional work and who would "review and analyze at regular intervals their clinical experiences." This was a "goal to seek" so that the
public could know to which hospitals they could go with safety.75 The
"minimum standard" evolved eventually into the accreditation standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals beginning
with a statement of the "minimum essential" in 1951 and currently stating the "optimal achievable. ' 76 The most important for the instant
purposes are those requiring hospital medical staffs to ensure that each
member is qualified, and that the staff "strive to maintain the optimal
level of professional performance" and "provide mechanisms for the
regular monitoring of medical staff practice and functions. 7 7
The forty-year gap between the beginnings of Dr. Codman's efforts
and those of the Joint Commission has been ascribed to attitudinal,
sociological and political factors rather than to technological difficulties. 78 Two facts are clear: between 1910 and 1965 the evaluation of
patient care by private staff physicians was not compelled by court
opinions; and the eventual infiltration into the courts of the concept
that a hospital had some responsibility for a staff physician's conduct
resulted from their recognition that a hospital's changed role had made
the old precedents obsolete. But abandonment of old learning is hard
for lawyers.
[J]ust as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the existence of some
earlier creature to which a collarbone was useful, precedents survive
served is at an end and the
in the law long after the use they once
79
forgotten.
been
has
them
for
reason
The English cases are particularly illustrative. After Hillyer and
Schloendorif the English and American cases do not refer to each
other, 0 but they reach parallel results for parallel reasons. Thus, comparison of the two groups demonstrates the futility of resisting an idea
whose hour has come, and they are cited for their analytical rather than
precedential value.
The notion from Glavin and Hilyer, adverted to in Schloendorff, that
a hospital was not liable for the professional negligence of its employees such as nurses, interns or physicians but only for their administra75. L. DAvis, supra note 65, at 204; Goldberg, supra note 70, at 445-46.
76. AMH, supra note 5, at ix-xi. "There is no adequate work on the standardization movement which grew out of the scientific orientation most marked in the medical and surgical specialities." M. VOGEL, THE INVENTION OF THE MODERN HoSPITAL, 1870-1930 at 148 n.34 (1980).
77. AMH, supra note 5, at 93, 106.
78. C. JACOBS, supra note 73, at 24-25.
79. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 31 (M. Howe ed. 1963).

80. Put see Rabon v. Rowan Mem. Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 5, 152 S.E.2d 485, 488 (1967)
(charitable immunity abolished; hospital liable for medical negligence of nurse); Comment, Private HospitalHeld LiableforMedicalNegligence of ProfessionalStaff, 57 COLLJM. L. REV. 104 1,
1043 n.23 (1957). Neither develops the references to English authority.
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tive or ministerial negligence, leads to absurd results. A hospital would
be liable if a nurse, in her capacity as a waitress, scalded a patient by
spilling hot tea on him but would not be liable if, as a nurse, she negligently dosed him with poison.8 ' This was a paradox that could not be
tolerated forever. Although a standard legal encyclopedia, Halsbury's
Laws ofEngland,had said, citing Hillyer, that a hospital was not liable
for the professional negligence of its nurses, the statement was refuted
by none other than Arthur Lehman Goodhart, Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford and later Master of University College, who suggested
"the law is almost exactly the opposite" and a "hospital is liable for the
negligence of its trained nurses." 82 Nothing from his pen was to be
taken lightly, nor was it. Despite the traditional aversion of English
courts to cite the works of living authors, Goodhart's article, Hospitals
and TrainedNurses became a basis of Gold v. Essex C.C.8 3
In Gold a little girl's face was disfigured through the negligence of a
competent but careless radiographer, an employee. The court rejected
the professional-administrative dichotomy, held the hospital liable, and
set the stage for the erosion of the idea that the relationship between a
hospital and its professional employees did not impose "the ordinary
duty of a person who deals with another through his servants or
agents."8 4 In Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council,8 5 a hospital was
held liable for the combined negligence of a student nurse and a pharmacist in the injection of a lethal dose of cocaine instead of the procaine that had been ordered. "[T]he case of Hillyer. . .is no longer a
binding authority."8 6 And in Cassidy v.Ministry of Health 7 a hospital
was held liable for the negligence of an employed physician who received a patient with two stiff fingers and sent him out with four-a
useless hand. Cassidy repudiates the idea that a hospital cannot be responsible for the acts of physicians simply because it cannot control
them and adopts the principle that hospitals have responsibilities for
the treatment of patients:
[A]uthorities who run a hospital ... are in law under the selfsame
duty as the humblest doctor; whenever they accept a patient for treatment they must use reasonable care and skill to cure him of his ailment. The hospital authorities cannot, of course, do it by themselves;
they have no ears to listen through the stethoscope, and no hands to
81. Gold v. Essex C.C. [1942] 2 K.B. 293, 302-03, 312-13.
82. Goodhart, supra note 54, at 553. This is said to be the most famous of Goodhart's articles. Baker, A.LG.: An Editor's View, 91 LAW Q. REv. 463, 464 (1975).
83. [1942] 2 K.B. at 297.
84. Hillyer v. Governors of St. Bartholomew's Hosp., [1909] 2 K.B. 820, 828-29.
85. [1947] 1 K.B. 598.
86. Id. at 616.
87. [1951] 2 K.B. 343.
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hold the surgeon's knife. They must do it by the staff they employ;
and if their staff are negligent in giving treatment, they are just as
liable for that negligence as is anyone else who employs others to do
his duties for him ...
It is no answer for them to say that their staff are professional men
and women who do not tolerate any interference by their lay masters
in the way they do their work. The doctor who treats a patient in the
Walton Hospital can say equally with the ship's captain who sails his
ship from Liverpool, and with the crane driver who works his crane
in the docks, 'I take no orders from anybody.' That 'sturdy answer,'
as Lord Simonds described it, only means in each case that he is a
skilled man who knows his work and will carry it out in his own way;
but it does not mean that the authorities who employ him are not
liable for his negligence. . . . The reason why the employers are liable in such cases is not because they can control the way in which the
work is done-they often have not sufficient knowledge to do sobut because they employ the staff and have chosen them for the task
and have in their hands the ultimate sanction for good conduct, the
power of dismissal.
This all seems so clear on principle that one wonders why there
should ever have been any doubt about it. Yet for over thirty
years-from 1909 to 1942-it was the general opinion of the profession that hospital authorities were not liable for the
negligence of
8
their staff in the course of their professional duties. 8

Some American jurisdictions had ignored the professional-adminis88. Id. at 603 (Denning, L.J.). Lord Denning relates the pathetic circumstances of Gold and
Cassidy in his little memoir. A. DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW 237-41 (1979). His reference
to a ship's captain is not to the "captain of the ship" doctrine know to American malpractice law.
See J. KING, THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 243 (1977). Lord Denning was referring to
the general rule that the employer of a ship's captain is responsible for the negligence of the
captain despite the owner's inability to control him. The critical issue is employment, not control.
Hibbs v. Ross, 1 L.R.-Q.B. 529, 542 (1866). Although ability to control may be a basis of liability,
inability to control does not inevitably lead to nonliability. Cf. River Wear Comm'rs v. Adamson, [1877] 2 A.C. 743, 741. The irrelevance of control is very old. Cf. Boson v. Sandford, 91 Eng.
Rep. 382 (1691). See generally, 35 HALsBuRY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, Shopping and Navigation
1056 at 703 (3d ed. 1961). The American law is the same. The Steamboat New World v. King,
57 U.S. (16 How.) 469, 475-76 (1853). Glavin's dictum that liability depended on control, 12 R.I.
at 424, 430-31, resulted in the special rule for hospitals. Exemption from liability by "reason of
superior knowledge and skills of the servant has never been applied in other situations." Skill is a
test "without legal or logical basis." Bobb6, Tort Liability of Hospitalsin New York, 37 CORNELL
L. REv. 419, 421,428 (1952). See also Cunningham, note 92 infra, at 534-35. "[T]he modem and
proper basis of vicarious liability of the master is not his control or fault but the risks incident to
his enterprise." Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 956, 960, 471 P.2d 988, 990, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 188, 190 (1970). Continental law is said to be similar. Kahn-Freund, ServantsandIndevendent Contractors, 14 MOD. L. REv. 504, 508 (1951).
The "captain of the ship" doctrine is typically a device to impose liability on a surgeon for
negligence of operating room personnel. McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 362 n.*, 65 A.2d
243, 246 n.1 (1949). It is a way of obtaining recovery from a physician when a hospital is protected by charitable immunity. Note that the immunity was not abolished in Pennsylvania until
16 years after McConnell. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965).
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trative dichotomy,89 but it survived in New York until Bing v. Thunig,90
that "brilliant opinion," 9 1 "the fall of the citadel" of hospital immunity.92 In Bing a patient was burned during surgery because nurses had
negligently failed to remove sheets on which an inflammable antiseptic

was spilled. The hospital defended on two grounds: that the nurses
had acted in a medical or professional capacity and on its charitable

immunity. The Court of Appeals rejected both defenses. The dichotomy had become so riddled with distinctions from which there could
be deduced "neither guiding principle nor clear delineation of policy,"193 as shown by what has been called a "perhaps colored catalog of
[its] anomalous results." 94 This disparagement seems undeserved, be-

cause some of the examples such as employers' liability for the conduct
of uncontrollable employees, such as airplane pilots and locomotive engineers, are no more extreme than those that already occurred to the
English judges, and are the sort that would occur to any objective inquirer who asked why hospitals were the beneficiaries of special rules.
And, as in God v.Essex C C., the court proceeded, contrary to Hillyer,

to impose "the ordinary duty of a person who deals with another
through his agents."95 Starting from the proposition that a hospital
treats patients and does not merely procure professional employees to

act on their own responsibility or provide facilities in which someone
89. Silva v. Providence Hosp., 14 Cal. 2d 762, 781, 97 P.2d 798, 808 (1940) (charitable immunity abolished; hospital liable in bed-rail case without regard to whether decision to omit rails was
by nurse or doctor; Schloendorff cited in dissent); Brown v. La Societe Francaise de Bien Faisance
Mutuelle, 138 Cal. 475,71 P. 516 (1903) (hospital liable for negligence of employed physician); see
Garfield Memorial Hospital v. Marshall, 204 F.2d 721, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (hospital liable for
acts of employed physician; California dictum followed); Rice v. California Lutheran Hosp., 27
Cal. 2d 296, 304, 163 P.2d 860, 865 (1945) (hospital liable for professional acts of nurses and
physicians despite argument based on Schloendorff); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS §26.11 at 1397 n.9 (1956).
90. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
91. Brown v. Moore, 247 F.2d 711, 717 (3d Cir. 1957) (hospital liable for negligence of employed physician). See Aoeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 376-77, 54 N.W.2d 639, 645-46 (1952)
(premonition of Bing).
92. Cunningham, The Hospital-PhysicianRelationshp: HospitalResponsibilityforMalpractice
o/Physicians in HOsPITAL LIABILITY 532 (M. Bertolet and L. Goldsmith eds., 4th ed. 1980) (detailed analysis of Brown, 138 Cal. 475, 536-40, 97 P.2d 798, 551-52).
93. 2 N.Y.2d at 661, 143 N.E.2d at 5, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
94. Note, HospitalLiability in New York Court ofAppeals: A Study in JudicialMethodology,
61 COLUM. L. REv. 871, 881 n.50 (1961). Bing should also dispose of the "antiquated [and] rather
meaningless notion that a corporation cannot practice medicine." SouTHwicK, supra note 25, at
197, 412; Cunningham, supra note 92, at 530 nn.31, 33. Inability to do an act does not preclude
liability for another's doing of the act. "Otherwise it is difficult to see how any corporate body
could ever be liable for the acts of their servants." Gold v. Essex C.C., [1942] 2 K.B. 293, 312.
If we were to rule that respondeat superior does not apply because the hospital is not
licensed as a Nurse, then it would seem to follow that an airline should not be liable for
the negligence of its pilot because the airline is not licensed to fly an aircraft.
Bernardi v. Community Hospital Association, 166 Colo. 280, 291,443 P.2d 708, 713 (1968) (applying Bing).
95. Cf. [1909] 2 K.B. at 828-29.
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else may act, 96 the court concluded:

The doctrine of respondeatsuperior is grounded on firm principles of
97
law and justice. Liability is the rule, immunity the exception. ....
Hospitals should, in short, shoulder the responsibilities borne by everyone else. There is no reason to continue their exemption from the
universal rule of respondeatsuperior.9

The rule of nonliability is out of tune with the life about us, at
variance with modern-day needs and with concepts of justice and
99
fair dealing. It should be discarded. ....

In sum, then, the doctrine according the hospital an immunity for
the negligence of its employees is such a rule, and we abandon it.10
Of course, until hospitals were held liable for the professional negligence of their employees, they would not be liable for the acts of nonemployees such as staff physicians. But liability for the acts of employees does not mean that they are also liable for the acts of non-employees. Bing v. Thunig was thus an indispensable, but not a complete,
basis for imposing liability on hospitals for acts of staff physicians retained by patients.' 0 ' Under Schloendorff a staff physician selected by
the patient could, despite Bing, still be considered "an independent
contractor, following a separate calling. . . involving the hospital in
no liability . .-. "o Unless one recognizes that the hospital treats patients, i.e., that the doctor is not following a "separate- calling" from
that of the hospital, it would be a routine invocation of the old idea that
the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the latter's
negligence. But this conventional rule is subject to many exceptions
"whose very number is sufficient to cast doubt upon the validity of the
rule" itself. 0 3 For example, the employer of an independent contractor
96. 211 N.Y. 125, 130, 132, 105 N.E. 92, 94 (1914).
97. 2 N.Y.2d at 656, 143 N.E.2d at 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 3 (1957).
98. Id. at 666, 143 N.E.2d at 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11.

99. Id. at 667, 143 N.E.2d at 9, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
100. Id.. Compare Bing with the language in Schloendorff:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body, and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's
consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages.
211, N.Y. at 129, 105 N.E. at 93, Schloendorff lives on as a basis for the present law of informed
consent J. KATZ & A. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES WHAT? 80 (1975).

101. No English case on liability of a hospital for negligence of a physician selected by a
patient has been found. The dicta say that there is no liability. See Cassidy v. Ministry of Health,
[1951] 2 K.B. 343, 362 (liability said to depend on who pays the physician); Gold v. Essex C.C.,
[1942] 2 K.B. 293, 302 (hospital not liable for negligence of consulting physicians and perhaps not
liable for that of house physicians). See also Kahn-Freund, supra note 88 at 508; 30 HALSBURY'S

LAWS OF ENGLAND, The Medical Profession and Medical Praclice 40, n.7 at 36 (4th ed. 1980).

But HALSBURY'S is not infallible. See Goodhart, supra note 54, at 553. And the further dictum in
Gold, that a hospital might not be liable for house physicians, was not followed in Cassldy.
102. Bing v. Thunig, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93; Johnson v. Misericordia Community
Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 722, 301 N.W.2d 156, 163 (1981).
103. W. PROSSER, supra note 16, §71 at 468. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§§409-29 (1965). Section 409 states a general rule of non-liability, and the following twenty sec-
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may be liable for his own negligence in selecting an incompetent, 't 4 or
for failure to supervise a concessionaire, 0 5 or for his own breach of a
non-delegable duty of care. A hospital has a non-delegable duty to
keep its premises safe. Thus, when a patient fell in a bath because she
was alarmed by a rat, the hospital did not escape liability simply because it had employed an exterminator as an independent contractor.'0 6 It would be a strange rule of law that would make a hospital
more liable for rats than for accepting or retaining deficient physicians

on its medical staff. Delegation to the staff of the duties of selection
and retention of its own members is no defense because the medical

staff is an agent of the hospital, and the hospital, therefore, remains
responsible for the staff's negligence.

7

And the staff itself, as an unin-

08
corporated association, may be liable and sued as an entity.1

These examples are intended to make obvious the distinction between the vicarious liability of hospitals for the acts of employees and

liability for their own, or corporate, negligence. The hospital is liable
for the acts of an employee whether or not it was itself negligent. But it

is not liable for the act of a staff physician merely because he commits
malpractice within the hospital; 1 9 the hospital is liable for negligence,

for example, appointing a physician to the staff or failing to review his
work; if it knew or should have known the physician might commit an
tions state exceptions thereto. Indeed, the Restatement says its "general rule" of nonliability of
employers of independent contractors "is now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of
its exceptions." Id. §409, comment b. PROSSER, supra, says there are twenty-four exceptions.
Whichever number is correct, the statement in SOUTHWICK, supra note 25, at 350, that the courts
have "circumvented" the defense of independent contractor, has an unwarranted pejorative quality. What the defense now seems to mean is that a hospital is not liable for a staff physician's
"collateral negligence." RESTATEMENT, supra, §426, illustration 3; Cassidy v. Ministry of Health,
[195112 K.B. 343, 364-65. Thus if an employee scalds a patient with hot tea, the hospital is liable.
But if a private physician, as a gracious act, serves a patient and scalds him, the hospital is not
liable, unless, of course, it had reason to know he was often careless. RESTATEMENT, supra, §411;
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.11 at 1407 n.51, 1410 (1956).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §411 (1965).
105. Id. at §415 (1965).
106. Hill v. James Walker Memorial Hosp., 407 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1969); SOUTHWICK, supra
note 25, at 404; W. PROSSER, TORTS §93 at 624 n.41 (4th ed. 1971).
107. Joiner v. Mitchell County Hospital Authority, 125 Ga. App. 1, 12, 186 S.E.2d 307, 308
(1971), a'd, 229 Ga. 140, 142, 189 S.E.2d 412,414(1972). SoUtrHwicK,supranote 25, at 196, 349.
The administration of the hospital must "stimulate the medical staff' to review "the professional
qualifications and performance of each individual staff physician." Id. at 411. Lord Denning
rebuked himself for failing as counsel in Gold v. Essex C.C. to make clear the non-delegability of
the duty of care. [1951] 2 K.B. 343, 363.
108. Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975); St. John's
Hosp. M.S. v. St. John Reg. M.C., 245 N.W.2d 472, 474 (S.D. 1976) (capacity of medical staff to
sue hospital).
109. Mayers v. Litow, 154 Cal. App. 2d 413, 316 P.2d 351 (1957); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19
N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967). Cf. Pogue v. Hosp. Auth., 120 Ga. App.
230, 170 S.E.2d 53 (1969), reviewedby Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 141,
189 S.E.2d 412, 414 (1972) (hospital not liable for negligence of independent contractor operating
emergency service where failure to supervise contractor not raised as hospital's own negligence).
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act of malpractice."' The qualifying phrase "should have known" is
necessary because if liability were restricted to cases of actual knowledge, "the less a hospital [knew] about a patient's condition, the safer it
[would be] against charges of negligence.""'
Darlingwas not startling because it invented any new rules of law; it
was startling because it applied the ordinary rules to hospitals and deprived them of the special privileges they once enjoyed, privileges that
were designed to ameliorate the financial burdens of charities in cases
where charitable immunity did not apply. When the immunity disappeared, the privileges were also destined for oblivion.
Despite the apprehensions it caused, Darling has not been the forerunner of a great number of other reported cases. The relatively few
cases up to 1978 have been variously listed and analyzed,I" and repeti113
tion here would be mere supererogation. But Fiorentino v. Wenger
should be noted. It held only that a hospital was not liable for failure
to ascertain that a surgeon had obtained the informed consent of a patient to a novel, indeed unique, surgical procedure."I4 Otherwise, there
was no claim of negligence on the part of the hospital."' The court,
however, delivered a dictum described as a "significant stride in developing" the Darling theory that a hospital has a "duty to monitor the
quality of care rendered within its walls.""I6 "[A] hospital will not be
held liable for an act of malpractice performed by an independently
retained healer, unless it had reason to know that the act of malpractice
would take place.""' 7
At least two trial courts have acted on this dictum. In Corleto v.
Shore Memorial Hospital,18 Florentino became a basis for allowing an
action against not only the hospital but also its administrator, board of
110. [A] hospital has a direct and independent responsibility to its patients, over and
above that of physicians and surgeons practicing therein, to take reasonable steps to
(1) ensure that its medical staffis qualified for the privileges granted and/or (2) to evaluate the care provided.
Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis.2d 708, 725, 301 N.W.2d 156, 165 (1981).
111. Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 185 Neb. 89, 94, 173 N.W.2d 881, 884 (1970);
99 Wis.2d 708, 739-44, 301 N.W.2d 156, 171-73 (1981).
112. E.g., W. CuRRAN, supra note 23, at 364-90, 474-81 (3d ed. 1982) (with copious references
to periodicals); HOSPITAL LIABILITY,supra note 92, passim; SOUTHWICK, supra note 25, passir;
Copeland, supra note 24. The two Wisconsin opinions seem to list all the relevant cases. 99
Wis.2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981), arig, 97 Wis.2d 521, 294 N.W.2d 501 (1980).
113. 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967).
114. For similar holdings see Cox v. Hayworth, 283 S.E.2d 392, 395 (N.C. App. 1981), and
Cooper v. Curry, 92 N.M. 417, 420, 589 P.2d 201, 204 (1979).
115. Fiorentino v. Wenger, 26 A.D.2d 693, 694, 279 N.Y.S.2d 557, 559 (1966) (dissent).
116. Dunn, supra note 24, at 16.
117. 19 N.Y.2d at 415, 227 N.E.2d at 299, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 378. The holding of nonliability
for allowing the experimental surgery has been questioned. W. CURRAN, supra note 23, at 480.
But H. Leslie Wenger had outstanding qualifications and was a vice president of the Euthanasia
Society of America. New York Times, Feb. 11, 1975, at 42, col. 3.
118. 138 N.J. Super. 302, 311, 350 A.2d 534, 538 (1975).
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directors and medical staff based on allegations that they should have

known that the operating physician was incompetent and nevertheless
permitted him to remain on a case obviously beyond his control. The
author relied on Fiorentino in Gonzales v. Nork which, although unreported, received much publicity."i 9 The Nork case, as it is usually

called, involved a hospital allowing a surgeon to perform a
laminectomy despite a history of bad results in that hospital. It has

been described as the first case in which "a hospital was held liable for
failure to adopt procedures to monitor the quality of medical care provided by a physician in the hospital."' 2 0 In retrospect the author views

it as also a case of the hospital's neglect in failing to use even the inadequate review procedures available in the late 1960'st2l or, to paraphrase

Professor Southwick, its liability for failure to "stimulate" its medical
staff to perform its peer-review responsibilities.' 2 2 Whichever characterization is correct, as a result of Nork the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals is said to have adopted new accreditation

standards,

23 now

found in its manual under "Quality Assurance."' 24

The hospitals settled in both Corleto and Nork. 2 5 If these settlements were efforts to suppress awkward holdings, they have been unsuccessful as shown by the three latest opinions to come to hand:
Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital,'2 6 Fridena v. Evans, 2 7

and Bost v. Riley.'28 Johnson held a hospital liable for the malpractice
of an incompetent surgeon whom it had appointed to the staff without

investigation. Fridena held one liable for negligent supervision of a
surgeon. And Bost, in effect, applied the ordinary rules to benefit the
119. Most of the opinion is reprinted in S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT 215-45 (1978).
The references to Fiorentinoare at 241 and 244. Other extracts are in Copeland, supra note 24, 5
N. Ky. L. Rev. at 74-75. For general references see SOUTHWICK, supra note 25, and HosPITAL
LIABILITY, supra note 92. Accounts of the case are in 29 Citation 18 (1974) and Goldberg, The
Duty of Hospitals and HospitalMedical Staffs to Regulate the Quality of Patient Care, 129 W.J.
Med. 443 (1978). The reference to reversal by the intermediate appellate court for holding Dr.
Nork had waived a jury trial in SoUTrHWtCK, supra note 25, at 421 n. 188, is wrong. The correct
citation is Gonzales v. Nork, 20 Cal. 3d 500, 573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978) (affirming
waiver ofjury). See S. LAW, supra at 215 n.*. For an example of the notoriety of the case see S.
BOK, LYING 155 (1978). The first California appellate opinion upholding corporate responsibility
of a hospital appeared after this paper had been sent to the press. Elam v. College Park Hospital,
132 Cal. App.3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982). The author's opinion in Nork is said to "articulate almost precisely the same standard as the Elam opinion." CALIFORNIA MALPRACTICE Topics
n.3 (D. Rubsamen ed. June 1982).
120. S. LAW, supra note 119, at 52.
121. S. LAW, supra note 119, at 245.
122. SOUTHWICK, supra note 25, at 349, 411.
123. S. LAW, supra note 119, at 65; Copeland, supra note 24, at 75.
124. AMH, supra note 5, at 151.
125. S. SHARPE, S. FiSCINA & M. HEAD, LAW AND MEDICINE 658 n.18 (1978) (Corleto); 29
Citation 19 (1974) (Nork).
126. 99 Wis.2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981), afg, 97 Wis. 2d 521, 294 N.W.2d 501 (1980).
127. 127 Ariz. 516, 622 P.2d 463 (1981).
128. 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391 (1980).
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hospital. The hospital had failed to enforce its rule requiring surgeons

to keep progress notes, which would be at least evidence of negligence.
But there was no showing that this failure contributed to the patient's
death from complications of a splenectomy. Therefore, under the ordi-

129
nary rules of legal causation, the negligence was not actionable.

"Negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.' T
In addition, "the view espoused in Darlinghas been embodied in the

statutory law of several states."' 13 ' Elsewhere, including California, it
may be found in administrative regulations having the force of law

which make a hospital, through its medical staff, responsible for the
quality of care of its patients. 32 It is also reflected in the requirements
of the Joint Commission 133 and hospital rules, 34 but these may be only
a grudging acceptance of the inevitable. For a while, after Nork, the
Joint Commission's standard on Quality of Professional Services was

36
imperative, t35 but it has since been qualified by precatory phrases.'

Some patients' bills of rights state hospital patients are entitled to "con-

siderate and respectful care,"'

37

but only the Pediatric Bill of Rights

states expressly that they are entitled to "competent health care."' 3 8
And although the prefatory statement to the American Hospital Association's version of a bill states, "Legal precedent has established that the
institution itself. . . has a responsibility to the patient," at the end of
the bill is the added statement: "No catalogue of rights can guarantee
for the patient the kind of treatment he has a right to expect.' 39 Un-

less one reads the word "guarantee" in a strict technical sense, the last
129. Thus failure to investigate competence is not a basis of liability where investigation
would have disclosed no reason for refusal of staff appointment. Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 64 Mich.
App. 685, 698, 236 N.W.2d 543, 550 (1976).
130. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 111.2d 348, 355, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (1977) (hospital
liable for preconception injury caused by transfusion of Rh positive blood).
131. SOUTHWlCK, supra note 25, at 413, lists Michigan, Indiana and Arizona. See Beeck v.
Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 170, 500 P.2d 1153, 1158 (1972).
132. 22 CAL. ADM. CODE §§70701, 70703 (1975).
133. AMH, supra note 5, at 56.
134. E.g., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO HOSPITALS AND CLINICS, BYLAWS,
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE MEDICAL STAFF 5, 21-22 (1979).

135. The hospital shall demonstrate that the quality of care provided to all patients is
consistently optimal by constantly evaluating it through reliable and valid measures.
Where the quality of patient care is shown to be less than optimal, improvement in
quality shall be demonstrated.
JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HospI-

TALS 143 (1979).
136. The hospital shall demonstrate a consistent endeavor to deliver patient care that is
optimal within available resources and consistent with achievable goals. A major component in the application of this principle is the operation of a quality assurance
program.
AMH, supra note 5, at 151.
137. W. CURRAN, supra note 23, at 750, 753, 762-63, 764.
138. W. CURRAN, supra note 23, at 757.
139. W. CURRAN, supra note 23, at 750, 751.
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sounds like a disclaimer. Standard consent forms continue to recite
that "all physicians furnishing services to the patient. . . are independent contractors and are not employees or agents of the hospital" but are
the patient's "agents, servants or employees."' 14 0 Even if the patient
read and understood what such phrases are intended to mean, i.e., his
consent was "informed," they would not exculpate the hospital from
or in
liability for its own negligence in appointment of incompetents,
14 1
failure to monitor the care delivered by its medical staff.
Johnson refers to "the common law duty of care owed to patients by
the hospital,"' 142 and Fridena to its "inherent responsibilities regarding
143
the quality of medical care furnished to patients within its walls."'
What these mean are that the courts, not the medical profession or the
custom of the community, will ultimately determine the standards of
care. Custom may be evidence of due care but it is not conclusive, for
there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard
will not excuse their omission.'" The courts will not determine those
precautions solely by a logical process; they will determine them by the
experience and felt necessities at the time of the decision. What they
now recognize is
the public's perception of the modem day medical scientific research
center with its computed axial tomography (CAT-scan), radio nucleide imaging thermography, microsurgery, etc., formerly known as a
general hospital, [and that the] public is indeed entitled to expect
our highly technical
quality care and treatment while a patient in
14 5
and medically computed hospital complexes.
In short, hospitals having shown what they can do have themselves established a standard of what they should do. And since what they can
and should do depends on constantly changing facts, no effort has been
made here to give a catalogue of hospital do's and don'ts. What has
been shown is one example of the malleability of the law in response to
changes in society and technology. This is not peculiar to the law relevant to medicine. Former Justice Potter Stewart, speaking of United
States Supreme Court decisions generally, says, "They reflect nothing
more than what was on the mind of contemporary America. Those
140. E.g., CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, CONSENT MANUAL 21 (conditions of admission), 41 (consent to surgery etc.) (10th ed., revised May, 1981).
141. TunkI v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963);
but 5. SOUTHWICK, supra note 25, at 423.
142. 99 Wis. 2d at 733, 301 N.W.2d at 169.
143. Fridena v. Evans, 127 Ariz. 516, -, 622 P.2d 463, 466 (1981).
144. Darling, 33 Ill. 2d at 331, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
145. Johnson, 99 Wis. 2d at 724, 301 N.W.2d at 164.
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decisions are a reflection of American morality with a time lag."'1 46
And if this leaves one with a sense that the law is unpredictable, it is no
more unpredictable than the society it depicts. "[C]ertainty generally is
illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man." t47

146. As quoted in Reeves, A Reporter at Large (Along Tocqueville's Path-Part1), Tim NEW
YORKER, April 5, 1982, at 77. For quite different examples of this phenomenon see Holman, The
Time Lag Between Medicine and Law, 9 LEX ET SCIENTIA 102 (1972), reprinted in W. CURRAN,

supra note 23 at 2.
147. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897).

